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SUMMARY 
When governments announce that they are going to spend vast sums of 
taxpayers’ money on a new public infrastructure project, you can be certain 
they will praise all the terrific new benefits that the project will bring to citizens, 
making everyone’s life easier, safer, greener and better. But this does not tell 
us whether we are better off as a society, after accounting for the cost of these 
projects borne by taxpayers today and well into the future. In reality, there is a 
meaningful risk that a project undertaken without a proper business case could 
end up making citizens’ lives worse. That new commuter train might look sleek 
and shiny and seem convenient for some, but a close business case analysis of 
recent transit projects in Canada’s three largest cities suggests that in as many 
as four cases out of 21 projects, the burden of paying for the projects does not 
justify the public investment.
In a review of thirteen recent public transit projects in the Greater Toronto and 
Hamilton Area (GTHA), at least three projects had benefits that fell short of the 
costs. Yet, all three projects went ahead (or have been funded). Only one project 
showed large net benefits for citizens once all considerations were accounted 
for. Three projects showed small net benefits – of a size that can be easily offset 
by a modest cost over-run. The six remaining projects did not have any publicly 
available business cases.
In the Greater Montreal area, a review of three recent major transit projects turned 
up no evidence of a publicly available business case for any of them. As a result, 
Montrealers are in the dark as to how much benefit or value destruction the three 
projects are responsible for. Things are far more encouraging in Vancouver, 
however, where three out of the five major transit projects undertaken or funded 
in recent years were backed by business cases showing a net benefit. Only one 
project did not show a net benefit and one project did not have a business case. 
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Of course, business cases only make projections about net benefits. Rarely, if ever, do 
governments undertake an ex post review to determine whether their estimates were 
correct and if the project has delivered — or destroyed — the value expected. Given that 
these projects can run into the billions of dollars, tie up immense amounts of government 
resources, and can cause any number of disruptions to business and families, it is 
remarkable how little cost-benefit scrutiny is brought to bear on them. Without these ex 
post business cases, there can be no lessons learned from past projects. There can be no 
assurance that we can make better investment decisions going forward.
1“ Tooling through the countryside during Duplessis’ watch, you could always tell which riding 
had voted for the (governing) Union Nationale, and which had sinned. The roads in Union 
Nationale ridings were paved, the others weren’t.” 
Mordecai Richler, “Redeem Duplessis? C’est Assez!” 
  National Post, June 12, 1999
“Thereistoomuchporkbarrelandtoolittlecost-benefitanalysisininfrastructuredecision-
making.Projectsshouldberequiredtopasscost-benefittestsandproposalslikeanational
infrastructure bank that would insulate a larger portion of decision-making from politics 
should be seriously considered.”
   Larry Summers, “The Case for a Proper Programme of Infrastructure Spending,” Financial 
Times, January 16, 2017
1. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure investment is one of the few policy issues that garners support across the entire 
political spectrum. It is also a topic of near unanimity among policy analysts and economists who 
tout the wider impacts of public infrastructure on much-needed productivity growth. However, the 
contribution of infrastructure investments depends on the quality of investment decisions. At the 
extreme, “bridges to nowhere” make no contribution to community well-being (other than possibly 
job-creation stimulus) and at worst, they take away resources and funding from better projects that 
are either delayed or not pursued at all. This is why public-infrastructure investment decisions are 
typicallysupportedbybusinesscasesthatestablishwhytheprojectinquestionisbeneficialtothe
community on a net basis (i.e., after accounting for the resources used to build the new asset and to 
deliver the associated services). 
However, not all business cases are created equally. Some business cases do not clearly establish 
the need being addressed. Some do not examine all the options for addressing the need, thereby 
ignoringpotentiallysuperioralternatives.Somebusinesscasesprovideonlyafinancialanalysis
and do not present an economic analysis of the options (i.e., also valuing the positive and negative 
impactsnotcapturedinfinancialanalysis),withoutwhichtherecanbenojustificationofan
investment decision from a public-interest perspective. Some business cases are more akin to 
promotional material and do not pass even basic commercial due-diligence tests.
This paper reviews the role of business cases in public-infrastructure investment decisions in 
Canada.1 For infrastructure projects in the public domain, this means taking a broad public-interest 
perspectiveand,assuch,incorporatingfinancial,economicandbroadersocio-economicand
environmental considerations. It asks the question whether Canadian governments are investing 
limited resources in infrastructure projects that create value for the community at large. It also 
considers how the practice of developing and using business cases to support decision-making can 
be improved in order to deliver better outcomes for the communities concerned.
The focus of the paper is primarily on infrastructure assets in public transit in Canada. There are 
severalreasonsforthis.First,public-transitprojectsalmostalwaysmakesignificantdemandson
the public purse, both during construction and operation. Second, there is a longstanding empirical 
practice of relying on business cases to justify the use of public funds in transportation and public 
1 Business cases have a role throughout the planning process, from conception through to appraisal, environmental 
assessment, procurement and post-implementation evaluation. Each province (and the federal government) has its own 
planning, project-approval and environmental-assessment processes. The purpose of this paper is not to explain what kind 
of business-case analysis is required at each stage, if any. The latter is the remit of each jurisdiction, which is responsible for 
its own detailed guidance documents. 
2transit in particular, a practice known as “transportation economics.” Third, other areas of public-
infrastructure investments in Canada, especially outside the transportation sector, are usually 
evaluated primarily on a commercial basis (energy projects, for example, are usually expected to 
generatepositivefinancialreturns)ortheyarenotevaluatedintermsoftheoveralleconomiccosts
andbenefits(forexample,socialinfrastructure).2 
The next section of this paper provides an overview of business cases across the Canadian 
infrastructure space. Section 3 reviews selected business-case frameworks used by transit-planning 
organizations such as Metrolinx and TransLink, the transportation authorities for the Greater Toronto 
and Hamilton Area and Metro Vancouver, respectively, which undertake many business cases each 
year. Section 4 examines business-case results for over 20 major public-transit projects in Canada’s 
three largest urban areas. These are projects that have been built or are under construction, under 
procurement or have been funded and as such would have been expected to receive considerable 
scrutiny by both sponsor and funding governments. Based on our review of these business cases, the 
last section provides several recommendations, lessons and good industry practices for the sponsor 
governments, transit agencies and senior-level governments funding the projects.
2. BUSINESS CASES IN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPACE
While policy discussions and even investors sometimes talk about infrastructure as a single asset 
class,inpractice,projectinvestmentdecisionsdiffersignificantlyacrossspecificassetclassesand
by type of owner or sponsor, as shown in Figure 1 below. One important distinction is between 
public and privately owned infrastructure. Public-infrastructure investments usually (but not 
always) commit funding from taxpayers today and sometimes well into the future, while privately 
owned infrastructure is usually privately funded (although public sector subsidies are possible). 
A second and perhaps more important distinction between asset classes relates to how investment 
decisions are made in practice. For some assets, like freight rail and energy, investment decisions 
aremadeprimarilyonacommercialbasis(i.e.,focusingonfinancialreturns).3 This tends to be the 
case not only for privately owned infrastructure, but also for provincial Crown corporations (e.g., 
Ontario Power Generation) or even municipally owned power companies, such as Calgary’s Enmax 
and Edmonton’s Epcor utilities. For other assets such as public transit, roads and water systems, the 
goldstandardforinvestmentdecisionsisaneconomiccost-benefittestthatincorporatesconsumer-
surplus measures related to mobility, health and safety, as well as externalities related to air quality, 
climate change and ecosystem preservation. It is fair to recognize that there are also asset classes 
whereinvestmentdecisionsaretypicallybasedneitheroneconomic-norfinancial-feasibility
tests, but are more likely based on political considerations and constrained by the available public 
funding.4 These assets invariably include public sector assets such as hospitals and other health, 
social and recreational infrastructure. In many cases, even other public sector infrastructure 
investmentscanbeheavilyinfluencedbypoliticalconsiderationsthatarenotnecessarilyconsistent
witheconomicorfinancialfeasibility.
2 There is an empirical literature that evaluates the willingness to pay for social and recreational infrastructure services 
or even basic services such as potable-water supply, which are subject to administered prices rather than market pricing 
(e.g.,seeBroxetal.,1996).Theresultsofthisliteraturecanbeusedalongwithbenefit-transfermethodsinordertoassign
economic values to the services under consideration. However, this literature has yet to gain broad acceptance in public-
policy and government circles. Also see Johnston et al., 2015 and Champ et al., 2017.
3 Provincial power companies are also subject to policy decisions that are made primarily for environmental reasons, 
suchasphasing-outcoal-firedelectricitygeneration,orfeed-in-tariff(FIT)programsforencouragingrenewable-energy
production. 
4 
Whenfinancial-feasibilitystudiesarecarriedoutinthesecases,theyarelimitedtodiscountedcash-flowanalysesthat
take account of the timing of grants and payments for construction. These are seldom analyzed as income-generating 
investments. 
3Business cases also differ by type of project decision and are certainly not limited to new builds 
or refurbishments. Changes in the pricing, funding and even regulations covering infrastructure 
services are strong candidates for business cases, especially when the changes are structural 
in nature and go beyond small, incremental adjustments (for example, transit fare and service-
integration reforms). Major changes in funding sources are also excellent candidates for business 
cases, since some revenue sources — typically tax revenues — entail additional economic costs by 
imposing distortions on labour markets and/or capital markets, while other sources, such as user 
fees,canentailpositivebenefitsbymoderatingoverconsumptionofcertainservices(e.g.,roadway
usage, in the case of tolls) or mitigating other negative externalities. 
Inpractice,infrastructurefundingisviewedalmostexclusivelyasabudgetingorfinancial-
feasibility issue, as in “is there enough money to fund the project?” Even when governments 
consider shifting to new, user-fee-based funding sources, little or no consideration goes into 
evaluating the economic implications of these decisions.
Businesscasesinvolvethejustificationofaparticularinfrastructureinvestmentordecision.The
overarching evaluation question is: “Does it make sense to commit scarce resources to any one 
project”?5 This entails asking (and answering) some follow-up questions, beginning with “what 
is the problem that needs to be addressed?” and undertaking a strategic analysis of the options 
available to address the problem. Notice that this question is necessarily economic in nature 
andgoesbeyondthefinancialimplicationsofeachoption.Theeconomiclenshereshouldbe
understood to value all impacts that matter to society, including the mobility, safety, environmental 
impacts and even urban form. It is also applicable to public infrastructure as well as privately 
owned infrastructure with no public subsidies. After all, some privately owned infrastructure could 
createnegativeexternalitiesthatoffsetanyprivatebenefits.Thisisconsistentwithappliedwelfare
economics practice, which takes an all-encompassing approach to evaluating alternatives, whether 
in the infrastructure space or elsewhere.
FIGURE 1 BUSINESS CASES IN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPACE
 
Evaluation 
Questions
Strategic
• What is the 
problem?
Economic
• Are we better off?
• By how much?
Financial
• Can we afford it?
• Who pays?
Deliverability
Distributional/equity 
considerations
Project Types
• New builds
• Refurbishments
• Regulations 
(economic, safety, 
land use, etc)
• Pricing decisions
• Funding sources
• Other policies and 
programs
Asset classes
Public ownership
• Transport
• Environment & 
water systems
• Health/social/ 
recreational 
Privately-owned 
infrastructure
• Freight railways
• Energy & pipelines
• Public-private 
partnerships
• Other
Stakeholders
• Sponsor/owner
• Regulator(s)
• Communities 
affected
• Funders/investors
• Taxpayers
• Other interest 
groups
5 The project refers not only to the physical infrastructure, where relevant, but also to the services delivered using that 
infrastructure. 
4While the economic lens provides the basis for justifying the choice of one or other alternatives, 
other questions may impose constraints against choosing the preferred option. For example, the 
optionwhichispreferredonaneconomicbasismaynotbefinanciallyfeasiblefortheownerofthe
asset. One can easily think of many potential infrastructure investments or refurbishments that 
would be value-creating in an economic sense, but where the infrastructure owners lack capital or 
evenoperationsfunding.Infact,mostmunicipaltransitorroadprojectsfitthisdescription.This
is usually where senior-level governments step in with grants. However, the question remains that 
if the economic analysis demonstrates users’ willingness to pay for new mobility services (for 
a transit or highway project), why can’t user pricing (fares, tolls, etc.) be used to monetize these 
apparentbenefits?Ofcourse,thisdoesnotapplytoenvironmentalandotherpositiveexternalities,
butitdoesapplytodirectuserbenefits,whichtypicallyaccountforthebulkofidentifiedbenefits.
Another potential set of constraints is the deliverability of a particular project option. Deliverability 
addresses the implementation risks during the planning, design and construction of the project 
as well as during subsequent operations. It covers the choice of technology for the different 
components of the asset (e.g., rolling stock, civil infrastructure, signalling and communications 
systems, etc.); the availability of the designated land or corridor for the purpose at hand; 
risks related to the environmental-assessment process or other regulations; and the choice of 
procurement approach (e.g., using traditional design-bid-build or an alternative delivery approach, 
which transfers more project risks to contractors). It also requires examining the business and 
governance model to be used for delivering the infrastructure services once the asset is ready for 
service (e.g., government-service delivery or some form of contracting out of the service delivery to 
private operators). 
Deliverability constraints typically translate into either higher capital or operating costs or 
delivery-schedule delays, or both. At the limit, some deliverability issues can also entirely 
undermine a particular project, as in the case of at least one Canadian airport light rail project 
where the designated right of way was not available because it was under the ownership and control 
of a freight-rail carrier. This underlines the importance of identifying deliverability risks at an early 
stage in the planning process. 
Understanding the equity and distributional impacts of each project alternative can also be an 
importantissueinbusinesscases.Equitycanbedefinedinanumberofdifferentways.For
example, vertical equity examines how the outcomes of the project (both positive and negative) are 
distributed by income (or wealth) group. The distribution of project outcomes can also be examined 
onageographicbasis,sincethespatialdistributionofbenefitsandcostsisanimportant(andoften
contentious)partofmanyinfrastructureprojects.Alsorelevantisapplyingthebenefitprinciple,
whichteststheextenttowhichthebeneficiariesoftheprojectarethosewhopayforit(viafares,
taxes or other fees). In addition, project outcomes can be examined across racial groups or visible 
minorities, as is often done for transit and transportation projects in the U.S., where Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in 
programs receiving Federal assistance.”6
The stakeholder dimension of business cases is about the project decision-making, accountability 
and transparency. It is about “who decides” which version of the project to propose: Who should 
be involved in the decision-making? Who should be informed about the potential outcomes of the 
different options? And who should have access to the evidence regarding potential outcomes? The 
reality for most owners and sponsors, typically municipalities, is that it takes years to conceive, 
develop, champion and execute a major infrastructure project. This is due not only to the need to 
secure funding from senior governments and undertake environmental-assessment processes, but 
6 See the U.S. Department of Transportation website for a comparison of Title VI and so-called “environmental justice” 
considerations, both of which are often examined for major infrastructure projects: https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/
environmental_ justice/equity/.
5also due to the need to line up support across the affected community and among key stakeholder 
groups. In the best of all possible worlds, business cases should help owners/sponsors decide 
which project alternative delivers the most value for users and the community at large. Secondly, 
it should also enable the affected community and interest groups to understand the impacts of the 
different project alternatives. Thirdly, it should enable senior-level governments to make informed 
funding decisions and to ensure their respective taxpayers are investing in projects that create 
value, improve regional economic competitiveness and that they meet other social, economic and 
environmental objectives of the affected communities.
2.1 Key Features of Business Case Evaluations
There are several key features of business-case evaluations. These include (i) the need for a 
comprehensive,butlimitednumberofwell-definedalternativestoaddresstheinfrastructureneed,
(ii)theidentification,quantificationandvaluationofcostsandbenefitsofeachalternative,and(iii)
the conditions required to ensure consistency of results across different business cases. We discuss 
each of these below.
 (i) Comprehensive,well-definedalternatives
Attheheartofanybusinesscaseisthedefinitionofaclearsetofalternativeprojectsforaddressing
the infrastructure needs in question as well as a reasonable characterization of what happens 
in the absence of any investment (often called the “do minimum”). The alternatives should 
be comprehensive in the sense of covering the full range of feasible alternatives, for example 
both infrastructure-intensive and other relevant alternatives. It should start with a full range of 
alternativesandillustratetheprocessforarrivingatashortlist—usuallynomorethanthreetofive
alternatives — in order to facilitate an in-depth analysis of each compared to the do minimum. It 
is clear from these requirements that arriving at a shortlist of alternatives is likely to be an iterative 
process. The iteration is necessary not only to identify the full range of alternatives, but also to 
retain the best or most instructive options, and to exclude those that are clearly inferior. Part of the 
refinementofalternativesalsohappensoverthenaturalcourseoftheplanninganddesignofthe
project,fromthetimeoftheinitialbusinesscasethroughtothefullandfinalbusinesscase.
 (ii) Valuingcostsandbenefits(includingwidereconomicbenefits)ofeachalternative
Theidentification,quantificationandvaluationofcostsandbenefitsinacommoncurrencyisa
very powerful tool because it allows for the value of each project alternative to be summarized 
byasinglemeasurethatcapturestheassociatednetbenefit(orcost)relativetothedominimum.
However, this requires that the valuation approach be both comprehensive and consistent across 
thealternatives.Thecostsandbenefitsoftheproject(or“intervention”asnotedinFigure2below)
refertoopportunitycostsandincrementalbenefits.Inotherwords,theseareresourcecostsor
benefitsthatwouldnothaveoccurredintheabsenceoftheproject.Theseincludefinancialorout-
of-pocketimpacts(called“directresourcebenefits”below)andwelfareimpacts,whichincludethe
value of time savings, improved safety, and environmental externalities. Notice that the standard 
CBA approach does not include the “transmitted economic effects” associated with the project. 
These capture the impact of the project’s construction and operations spending on output, jobs and 
tax revenues using an input-output model. As such, these economic impacts provide a description 
ofthe“footprint”oftheproject,buttheycannotbeinterpretedas"incremental"orasbenefits
that would be lost to the community if the project did not proceed.7 In circumstances where there 
is excess capacity in the local construction and engineering trades, it is possible that the project 
spending would lead to a net positive increase in output and welfare. However, these tend to be 
7 Economic-impact studies are often undertaken for major infrastructure projects in North America. See AECOM (2012) for 
a comparison of economic impacts derived from input-output models, macro-economic models and micro-economic/CBA 
models. 
6exceptional circumstances and even macro-economic models are often ill suited to evaluating the 
net output effects of the project spending (e.g., models without price and wage effects associated 
with the additional spending).
One set of impacts that has not been incorporated in most CBAs in North America is the so-
called“widereconomicbenefits”(seeshadedboxtotherightinFigure2).Theseimpactsinclude
agglomeration economies, labour-supply impacts, commuters shifting to more productive jobs, and 
changes in output resulting from lower transportation costs. Agglomeration economies arise when 
increasedconcentrationofeconomicactivitygeneratesproductivitybenefitsthroughlabour-market
pooling, knowledge spillovers, specialization, and the sharing of inputs and outputs. If a project 
leads to lower commuting costs (time and/or money costs), it can increase labour supply and even 
lead to the relocation of workers to more productive jobs.
FIGURE 2 WHAT’S IN/OUT OF A TRANSPORTATION COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS?
 
Source: International Transport Forum, Quantifying the Socio-Economic Benefits of Transport, 2017, p. 12.
Totheextentbusinessesbenefitfromanyofthereductionintransportationcosts(e.g.,for
businesstripsorshippingcosts)inimperfectlycompetitivemarkets,aprojectwillenablefirms
toincreaseprofitsbyincreasingtheiroutput.Thiswillgeneratewelfaregainsforconsumersto
the extent that their willingness to pay for the extra output exceeds the cost of producing it.8 All 
ofthesewidereconomicbenefitsareatleastinpartincrementaltothestandardCBAresults.For
example, agglomeration economies are positive externalities arising from increased concentration 
of economic activity associated with any reduction in transportation costs in urban areas. These  
are not captured in conventional CBAs of time or cost savings resulting from a new project. Nor  
do CBAs capture the portion of any increase in labour supply and labour income that goes to 
incometaxesandpayrolltaxes(i.e.,thetaxwedge).Allofthesewidereconomicbenefitsshould 
bequantifiedaspartofeconomicevaluationsofprojectalternatives,ifthereisreasontobelieve
8 
SeeGilletal.(2011)andAECOM(2012)foradiscussionofwidereconomicbenefits.Bothsourcesalsoexplainwhythese
are considered legitimately as incremental to the standard CBA results. 
7thattheyaresignificantinempiricaltermsfortheprojectsandthegeographyunderconsideration.
Agglomeration economies have been estimated for a few Canadian transit investments, but these 
have been done using productivity elasticities drawn from U.K. industrial sectors.9
 (iii) Consistency across business cases
The CBA approach can be a powerful tool for comparing projects, but it requires consistency of 
methodology and assumptions in order to enable meaningful comparisons across business cases. 
This means:
• Valuingthesamecostsandbenefits(i.e.,ifwidereconomicbenefitsareestimatedinone
business case, these should also be included in others).
• Using the same valuation assumptions (e.g., value of time, value of time growth, etc.), unless 
thereisastrongcasefordifferentvaluationassumptions(e.g.,ifdifferentcitiesoridentifiable
groups of users have a different willingness to pay for time savings or other amenities).
• Making adjustments to the results of one or more business cases to ensure that the two 
rules above are enforced (e.g., adjusting the time-value assumptions). According the U.K. 
WebTAG guidance,10 the adjustments can be done in two stages: 
(i) calculatinganadjustedbenefit-costratio(BCR)bymonetizingsomeofthequantitative
and qualitative impacts for which there is no explicit guidance or which are subject to 
greater uncertainty; and
(ii)  taking account of all the other impacts that have not been monetized. If the expected 
magnitudeoftheseimpactsislikelytoaltersignificantlytheBCR,thisshouldbe
reported along with the direction and magnitude of the change.
• Verifyingtheresultsofeachbusinesscasetoidentifyanysignificantflawsoranyareas
of uncertainty. CBA results should not be taken at face value. Instead, it is important 
to conduct basic due diligence on each CBA by checking some of the usual sources for 
methodological errors, including: demand/revenue forecasts (by asking: are these credible?), 
especially where these are based on constant annual growth rates over a very long time 
period;thedefinitionofthedo-minimumscenario(asking:isitareasonablealternativein
the absence of any investments?); the main sources of value creation; and the treatment of 
terminal values.
3. SELECTED BUSINESS-CASE FRAMEWORKS
This section reviews two selected business-case frameworks that have been used extensively 
toundertakebusinesscasesinOntarioandtherestofCanada.Thefirstframeworkistypically
called a multiple-account evaluation (MAE) framework and was used until recently by Metrolinx 
and TransLink. 
9 See for example AECOM (2013). Agglomeration elasticities by industry have not yet been estimated for Canada or the U.S.
10 U.K. DfT 2017. Value for Money Assessments. Accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/255126/value-for-money-external.pdf.
8FIGURE 3 MULTIPLE-ACCOUNT EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
ACCOUNTS IMPACTS PRIVATE/SOCIAL MONETIZED INCREMENTAL 
Transportation User 
Account
• Travel-time savings, including in-vehicle 
time, access times, service frequency and 
interchange penalties 
• Travel-time reliability, punctuality
• Automobile operating-cost savings
• Safety benefits
Mainly private (with some 
social impacts — conges-
tion, safety, etc.)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Financial Account • Ridership revenues 
• Capital and operating costs 
Private
Private
Yes
Yes 
(1)
Yes 
Environmental Account • Greenhouse gas emissions 
• Local air-quality impacts, including public 
health impacts
• Noise and vibration impacts
• Water-quality impacts 
Social
Social
Social
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Economic Development 
Account 
• Standard economic impacts of project 
spending (construction and operations 
phases) 
• Industry, supply-chain effects and spatial 
distribution of impacts
• Land-value impacts 
• Wider economic benefits
Mainly private with some 
social impacts
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Social Community 
Account 
• Vertical- and horizontal-equity impacts
• Intensification, urban form and land-use 
shaping 
• Health and accessibility 
Social No
No
No
(2)
Notes: (1) If a project generates additional ridership revenues, this is an indication of users’ willingness to pay for the 
services being delivered. (2) The amenities associated with various urban forms (e.g., tree-lined sidewalks) can be 
monetized using a benefit-transfer approach.
The main feature of this approach is that it supports the examination of a wide range of impacts 
thatarecategorizedintoseveralaccounts,asshowninFigure3below.Thefigureshowsthemain
accounts that are used in the evaluation; the impacts covered in each account; whether these 
impacts are borne only privately or whether there are also social impacts (i.e., externalities); 
whether impacts can be monetized; and whether or not the impacts can be considered incremental 
(i.e., whether or not these can be incorporated into a CBA). The MAE approach is a versatile tool 
whenusedappropriatelytoestimateBCRsandnetbenefits.Itisversatile,becauseitallowsfor
analysisofawiderangeofimpacts,notallofwhichcanbequantifiedandmonetized.Evenamong
theimpactsthatcanbequantifiedandmonetized,notallareincrementaloradditiveinaBCR
calculation. For example, most of the economic-development impacts cannot be incorporated as 
benefitsintotheBCRcalculation.Thisisthecaseforbothstandardeconomicimpactsandland-
value impacts, both of which cannot be considered incremental in that they would likely have 
occurred even without the project (but at other locations in the regional economy).
One drawback of this approach is that no guidance is provided on how to calculate the BCRs. 
In fact, some early business cases based on this approach presented the results on an account-
by-account basis, but did not explicitly report the overall BCRs.11 The appropriate procedure to 
calculate the BCR is to add all the transportation and environmental impacts, calculated on a 
present-value basis over the relevant horizon, and divide by the total project costs (capital and 
operating costs) over the same horizon. It is not appropriate to add the impacts for all other account 
and/or to weight the accounts in any way.
11 For example, see MKI (2009).
9The second framework, which has been adopted more recently by Metrolinx, is based on the four-
caseframeworkusedintheU.K.andNewZealand.Theframeworkhasnotyetbeenfinalized,but
the four cases are described as follows based on Metrolinx (2015b):
• The strategic case is intended to develop the shortlist of options that address the problem at 
hand and ensure the options are consistent with the Regional Transportation Plan and other 
relevant government objectives.
• ThefinancialcaseexaminesthefinancialimpactofeachprojectoptiononMetrolinx(relative
to the base case) and other key stakeholders, such as the transit operator (relative to the base 
case). It also examines the funding requirements for the projects and the relevant sources of 
funding. 
• The economic case evaluates the economic impact of each project option relative to the base 
case. The economic case covers all mobility, safety, environmental and other welfare impacts 
that can be attributed directly to the project. The results are reported in terms of BCRs and/or 
net economic value creation for the relevant horizon.
• The deliverability case examines whether each option is technically and commercially 
feasibletobuildandoperate.Itexamineswhethertherearesignificantrisksassociatedwith
constructability, stakeholder engagement, access to property, operations or other factors that 
could materially affect costs and/or schedule, or render the option unfeasible.
There does not appear to be an explicit role for a vertical-equity analysis of the options, or for an 
analysis of the economic-development impact of each option. However, the framework is still a 
work in progress and these considerations can be incorporated in one or other of the four cases.
4. SELECTED BUSINESS-CASE RESULTS
This section examines selected business-case results for major public-transit projects in Canada’s 
threelargesturbanareas.Specifically,weidentifiedallpublic-transitinvestmentsof$500million
or more12 in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA), Greater Montreal, and Metro 
Vancouver that met at least one of the following criteria:
• Completed in the last 10 years
• Currently under construction
• Currently in procurement
• Approved and funded
The rationale for this particular focus is that:
• Public transit almost always requires public funding and it can generate substantial 
externalities in terms of mobility, safety and environmental outcomes.
• Allthreeurbanregionshavereliedonbusinesscasesandbenefit-costanalysesduringthis
period in order to justify public investments in the transit space.
• By focusing on projects that are already completed, or at least fully funded, we are avoiding a 
whole host of unfunded projects that may not have been subject to as much scrutiny.
12 Refers to capital costs expressed in currency of year reported, unless otherwise noted. 
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This scope also yields a manageable number of projects with a wide range of results that can 
provide valuable lessons for other jurisdictions across Canada. For the purpose at hand, a business 
case should meet three minimum conditions:
• It should examine at least one project alternative.
• The project alternative should be compared to a base case or do-minimum scenario (a 
scenario without the project) that is reasonable and feasible.
• Itshouldincludeafullcomparisonofcostsandbenefitsoveratimehorizonappropriatefor
the project.
In addition to these three conditions, the sample of transit infrastructure projects was also 
examined for four other conditions of good governance in business-case planning:
• Business case is available in the public domain, thereby supporting transparency and 
accountability of decision-making for major public investments.
• Net positive value was created from an ex ante perspective (i.e., before the project is delivered).
• Other alternatives (in addition to the preferred alternative) were explored in the business case, 
therebyprovidingsomeconfidencethatnosuperioralternativeswereavailabletoaddressthe
problem at hand.
• An ex post business-case evaluation (i.e., after the project is in service) was conducted in 
order to provide valuable lessons for other projects.
4.1 Major Transit Projects in Greater Montreal
The Greater Montreal area has three major transit projects that meet the selection criteria above, 
asshowninTable1.Thefirsttwoarealreadyinserviceandthethirdisinprocurement.There
is no business case in the public domain for any of these projects, although our understanding is 
thatbusinesscaseswerecompletedforthefirsttwoprojects.Thereisonlylimitedevidencethat
any alternatives other than the project version implemented were examined as part of the business 
case or feasibility analysis. Finally, neither of the two projects already in service have had ex post 
business-case analyses conducted. 
TABLE 1 GREATER MONTREAL TRANSIT INVESTMENTS
Stage Capex $M
Public  
CBA
Net Value 
$M, PV BCR
Alternatives 
Analyzed
Ex Post  
CBA
Subway Extension to Laval In service (2007) 745 No (100) 0.71 -- No
Train de l’est (Mascouche) In service (2014) 730 No -- Yes(*) No
Réseau Électrique 
Métropolitain (REM) Procurement 6,040 No -- -- No
(*) Other options examined but not through a CBA.
Notes: All figures expressed in currency of year reported, unless otherwise noted.
CBA: Cost-benefit analysis.
BCR: Benefit-cost ratio.
PV: Present value.
The extension of the Montreal subway to the city of Laval on the North Shore of the island of 
Montreal was announced by the Quebec government in the run-up to the 1998 provincial election, 
withacapitalcostof$179million.Atthetime,theprojectwasnotpartoftheplanningpriorities
of either the provincial department of transportation (i.e., the Ministère des Transports du Quebec 
(MTQ)) or the Agence métropolitaine de transport (AMT), the regional transit-planning agency 
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created by the provincial government in 1996.13 As a result of a review by the auditor general 
of Quebec, it was reported that a business case was completed in June 2000 showing a BCR of 
0.71.14Thissuggeststhattheprojectwasexpectedtoleadtoaneconomiclossofatleast$100
million.15 However, in retrospect, this result appears to be unduly harsh, because casual observation 
suggests that the three new subway stations appear to have attracted many new subway riders, 
even contributing to congestion on the subway’s Orange Line. It is not clear to what extent that the 
subway extension has cannibalized ridership on the AMT’s commuter-rail network, which extends 
to the same part of Laval. However, this project would appear to be a good candidate for an ex post 
CBA, the results of which could conceivably vindicate the project.
For the Train de l’Est project, a CBA was undertaken, but it is not in the public domain. There  
is evidence that other alternatives were examined at various times, but not as part of the CBA.  
One alternative through the city of Laval could have used an existing CP rail corridor and a 
second alternative could have relied entirely on the existing CN rail corridor and avoided the 
construction of a new 12-kilometre rail corridor, but it would not have served the towns of 
Terrebonne and Mascouche.16
The REM project had its roots in an agreement between the Quebec government and the Caisse 
de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ) announced in January 2015.17 The agreement gave the 
CDPQthefirstrightofrefusaltoassumethefullownershipofnewpublic-transitprojects.The
Quebec government assigned two pre-existing projects to the CDPQ:
• Light rail transit (LRT) service from the South Shore of Montreal to downtown via the new 
Champlain Bridge.
• LRT service from downtown Montreal to the West Island via the Trudeau airport.
The CDPQ came up with a third project, which incorporates the two above, but is different in 
several other respects:
• It is a new region-wide light rail network, extending from the Montreal South Shore to the 
North Shore and to the western extremity of the island.
• It replaces the existing heavy rail commuter network operated by the AMT along the Deux-
Montagnes corridor, the highest-ridership corridor, with the proposed light rail network.
• The new LRT route to the airport is no longer direct from downtown Montreal, but instead 
travels via the existing Deux-Montagnes corridor, which is a longer-distance but higher-
ridership route also intended to serve other destinations.
This third, region-wide project is now under procurement. In all likelihood, this project may be 
more viable in economic terms than the original two projects, and particularly the original airport 
LRT. However, there is no evidence that other region-wide alternatives were examined, which 
raises the question of whether or not the new project represents the best alternative for the region  
intermsofmobility,safetyandenvironmentalvalue.TheCDPQhaspublishedsomefinancial
13 For a summary of the project procurement, see Iacobacci (2008: 28-31). 
14 
VérificateurgénéralduQuébec(2004:156).
15 
Thenetlossisbasedonapplyingthe0.71BCRtotheprojectcapitalcostatthetimeoftheCBA($345million).Thetruenet
lossshouldbebasedontotalprojectcosts,includingoperations,whichwereamultipleofthe$345-millionfigure,giventhat
actual capital costs turned out to be more than twice as high. 
16 See submission by the Accès L’Assomption during the environmental-assessment process: http://www.bape.gouv.qc.ca/
sections/mandats/Train_Est/documents/DM27.pdf.
17 Agreement between Gouvernement du Quebec and Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec 2015.
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information and ridership results for the REM, but it is not possible to assess whether the project 
creates net economic value for the region and if so, how much.18
4.2 Major Transit Projects in Greater Toronto
TheGTHAhasjustoveradozentransitprojectsthatfitthecriteriaforeligibleprojects.Only
two of these projects are already in service: the Union Pearson Express and the Georgetown 
South Service Expansion. Five projects are under construction, four are in procurement and two 
areapprovedandfunded.Thefirstfiveprojectsdonothavebusinesscasesinthepublicdomain.
Hence, we do not know if these are creating value for users and the public at large. The eight 
remaining projects all have business cases, although the evidence regarding value creation is 
mixed. Moreover, for one project — the Scarborough subway extension — the business-case 
methodology does not provide any estimate of expected value creation.
TABLE 2 GREATER TORONTO AND HAMILTON AREA TRANSIT INVESTMENTS
Stage Capex $M(*) Public CBA
Net Value 
$M, PV BCR
Alternatives 
Analyzed Ex Post CBA
Union Pearson Express In service (2015) 456(**) No -- -- No No
Georgetown South In service (2015) 1,500 No -- -- No No
Union Station 
Revitalization Construction 1,393 No -- -- -- N.A.
Toronto-York Spadina 
Subway Ext. Construction 3,184 No -- --
Partly  
(RTES 2001) N.A.
East Rail  
Maintenance Facility Construction 859 No -- -- -- N.A.
Eglinton Crosstown LRT Construction 3,345 Yes (673) 0.77 Yes N.A.
Hurontario LRT Procurement 1,194 Yes 212 1.24 Yes N.A.
Finch West LRT Procurement 443 Yes (183) 0.75 Yes N.A.
Hamilton LRT Procurement 829 Yes 69 1.1 Yes N.A.
vivaNext York  
Region BRT Construction 1,509 Yes (239) 0.9 Yes N.A.
GO Regional  
Express Rail Procurement 8,547 Yes 23,381 3.3 Yes N.A.
Scarborough  
Subway Ext. Funded 3,159 Yes No base case Subway only N.A.
GO Rail  
Bowmanville Ext. Funded 572 Yes (330) 0.56 No N.A.
Notes: See Table 1.
(*) Capital costs sourced from CBA, expressed in currency of year reported. 
(**) This cost estimate does not include any of the capital costs for the Georgetown South rail-corridor expansion, some 
of which is used to support the UPX service (AGO, 2012: 210).
The Union Pearson Express (UPX) has a history going back at least to the early 2000s, when the 
GovernmentofCanadalaunchedaprocurementtodesign,build,financeandoperateadedicated
air-rail link service from Toronto’s Union Station to Pearson International Airport. This included 
transferring revenue and demand risk to a private-sector consortium. Not surprisingly, the 
18 CDPQ Infra (2017: 3) notes that “the REM project’s rate of return (is expected) to be in the range of 8% to 9%.” However, 
thisisafinancialrateofreturnandnottheeconomicrateofreturnthatwouldbeprovidedbyaCBAstudy.Thesamesource
alsoindicatesthatthetotalcostoftheREM(i.e.capitalandoperating)willbebetween$0.69and$0.72perpassenger-km
ascomparedtoacostofexistingnetworksof$0.66perpassenger-km–withthelatterestimatecoveringonlyapartofthe
capitalcosts.Thisappearspromisingintermsoffinancialandeconomicvaluecreation,butitdoesnotaddressthebenefits
side of the CBA analysis.
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preferredbidderwasunabletoreachanagreementandsecurefinancingfortherevenue-riskproject
followingtheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008–09and,asaresult,abandonedtheprojectin2010
(AGO, 2012: 211). The responsibility for the project was assumed by the Province of Ontario and 
Metrolinx, the provincial transit agency for the GTHA.19 Metrolinx sought to implement a similar 
project alternative that had been under discussion with the private concessionaire, which was a 
premium rail service for airport travellers.20 Little consideration appears to have been given to 
other alternatives, such as also serving the commuter market to Pearson airport, which is a major 
employment hub in the GTHA. 
When UPX entered revenue service in 2015, ridership was well below the expected level of 
5,000passengersperday.Asaresult,thepremiumfareof$27.50pertrip(or$19forthosewith
aPrestofarecard)—whichwaspracticallyidenticaltothe$27fareproposedbytheoriginal
privateconcession—wasreducedto$12pertrip($9withPresto).Whilenoexantebusiness
case is available publicly, the large fare reduction suggests that users’ willingness to pay for the 
new service was much less than expected and that the commuter market may have been a more 
important share of overall ridership than expected. An ex post ridership study has been initiated, 
but neither that study nor an ex post CBA is yet available publicly.
As with UPX, the next four projects in Table 2 do not have public business cases either. This is in 
part because the planning for these projects started well before the creation in 2006 of Metrolinx, 
which has had a practice of undertaking and publishing business cases. This appears to be the case 
for the Union Station Revitalization project and the Georgetown South Expansion. The Toronto-
York Spadina Subway Extension was managed directly by the City of Toronto. Again, we could not 
locate a CBA in the public domain, although there is some evidence that an analysis of alternatives 
was undertaken (Toronto, 2002). The same holds for the East Rail Maintenance Facility, with 
Metrolinx completing a feasibility study of alternative locations for such a facility in April 2009.21
The next four projects are all new LRT projects with business cases completed under the Metrolinx 
Multiple Account Evaluation framework. The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is currently under 
construction and is expected to be in revenue service in 2021. The business case examined four 
alternatives: three LRT alternatives and one subway alternative. The LRT business-case alternative 
(Option 3 — “Transit City Concept”), which is closest to the project now under construction, had 
abenefit-costratioof0.77,whichincludesanestimateofreliabilitybenefits(lower-boundonly)
andwidereconomicbenefits.22Basedontotalprojectcostsof$2,928million,thisimpliesaloss
invaluetosocietyatlargeof$673milliononapresent-valuebasis.However,itappearsthatthe
project under construction differs slightly from Option 3 (for example, it consists of one fewer 
station or stop than Option 3), but it is not clear what the impact is on the CBA results.23
It is also worthwhile noting that one of the Eglinton Crosstown LRT alternatives in the business 
case that was not pursued (Option 1 — “Eglinton-Scarborough Crosstown LRT”) had a BCR 
of 1.01, suggesting it could achieve break-even. However, this alternative is redundant in the 
current context because it would have replaced the aging Scarborough Rapid Transit with an LRT 
19 The air-rail link was included in The Big Move, the Metrolinx regional-transportation plan published in November 2008. 
It was also subject to an environmental assessment jointly with the Georgetown South Service Expansion (published June 
2009).
20 
TheMetrolinxfive-yearstrategydocument(2011)describes“therailconnectionbetweendowntownTorontoandPearson
International Airport … (as) a new premium service which does not currently exist in the region.”
21 See Town of Whitby (2012: 4).
22 
ReliabilitybenefitsandwidereconomicbenefitsarenottypicallyincludedinMetrolinxbusinesscases.Withoutthese
benefits,theTransitCityConcepthadaBCRofonly0.37.ThisraisestheissueofthecomparabilityoftheEglinton
Crosstown business-case results with other business cases undertaken in the GTHA. However, it should also be recognized 
thatreliabilitybenefitsarelikelytobemoreimportantforthisprojectthanforothers.
23 See Infrastructure Ontario (2016: 4) for a description of the project under construction. 
14
alternative instead of the Scarborough Subway Extension that is currently being pursued by the 
City of Toronto. No BRT alternative appears to have been analyzed for the Eglinton Crosstown 
business case.
The Hurontario LRT project, which is currently under procurement, has been subject to 
considerable business-case analysis. The project under procurement — which extends from Port 
CreditatthesouthendtoSteelesAvenueatthenorthend—hasaBCRof1.24anddelivers$212
million in net value creation, as shown in Steer Davies Gleave (2016a). The latter CBA examined 
only the alternative now in procurement. A 2014 CBA undertaken as part of the transit-project 
assessment process (TPAP) also examined just the one alternative, but it included the Main Street 
segment that was subsequently rejected by Brampton City Council — with the result showing a 
slightly lower BCR at 1.14. The original 2010 CBA examined three alternatives, including an LRT-
only, a BRT-only and a mixed LRT/BRT option. The LRT option had a BCR of 1.5 compared to a 
BCR of 1.0 for the mixed BRT/LRT option. This suggests that the project underway is the highest-
value alternative among those examined. The only caveat is that the BCR for the BRT option in 
the2010studywasnotreportedbecause“thedisbenefitsofun-serviceddemandhavenotbeen
included” (Metrolinx, 2010).24
The Finch West LRT — which connects the new Finch West subway station on the Toronto-York 
Subway Extension on the east to Humber College on the west — is also in procurement.25 An 
executive summary of the latest CBA undertaken for this project indicates a BCR of 0.75, implying 
anetlossinvalueof$183millioninpresent-value2012dollars(SteerDaviesGleave,2015).
However, a sensitivity analysis was done to capture the impact of the project on leisure trips to the 
Woodbine Racetrack. This showed the project attaining break-even when the impact of current and 
potential Woodbine visitors is factored into the CBA results. 
The Finch West LRT CBA cited above examined only one project alternative — likely because it was 
the preferred alternative at that stage. Several LRT alternatives were examined as part of an earlier 
CBA for the entire Sheppard-Finch corridor (Metrolinx, 2009a), but this was a much larger project, 
the results of which are not easily comparable to the Finch West CBA. Nevertheless, the Sheppard-
Finch CBA showed that a continuous LRT connecting Sheppard East to Finch West via Don Mills 
Road was the highest-performing alternative with a 0.9 BCR. No BRT alternatives were explored. 
The Hamilton LRT project was originally proposed as part of the MoveOntario 2020 initiative 
announced by the Government of Ontario in June 2017 and it was also one of the top 15 projects 
in The Big Move (Metrolinx, 2008), along with the other GTHA LRT projects discussed above. 
The Hamilton King-Main CBA study (Metrolinx, 2010) examined three options for a new rapid-
transit corridor from McMaster University to Eastgate Square (known as the B-Line): (1) a full 
BRT service, (2) a full LRT service, and (3) a phased LRT, where the LRT service on the eastern 
segment of the corridor is postponed to 2030. The CBA study reported that the BRT option had the 
highest BCR (1.4) and that both LRT options had a BCR of 1.1. However, the full BRT and phased 
LRToptionsexhibitedsimilarnetvaluecreation($93millioninpresent-valueterms)ascompared
24 This is unusual, because mode-choice models, which distinguish between BRT and LRT travel modes, usually capture all 
thegeneralizedcostsandbenefitsassociatedwitheachoption.Ourowncalculationsusingthefiguresinthe2010report
indicate a BCR of 1.63 for the BRT option (i.e., only marginally higher than the 1.5 BCR for the LRT option), but it is 
unclearwhich“disbenefits”werenotincluded.
25 The executive summary was published on the City of Toronto website. The full business case is not publicly available. Only 
the older Sheppard-Finch CBA is available on the Metrolinx website.
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toonly$69millionforthefullLRToption.26 Nevertheless, Hamilton City Council recently voted to 
proceed with an LRT service along the entire corridor, which appears closest to the full LRT option 
— the option with the lowest net value creation.27 
The vivaNext project in York Region is the second phase of an original BRT service that opened 
between2005and2008andnowconsistsofarticulatedbusesinmixedtraffic.ThevivaNext
project now underway consists of building segregated bus lanes with signal priority, which would 
improve run times and service reliability. The CBA report analyzed two options with the same 
proposed BRT network: Option 1 to be built by 2018 and Option 2 had a portion of the network 
deferred until 2026. The results for both options suggested that the project does not create any net 
economic value, with Option 2 exhibiting a slightly higher BCR (0.9) than Option 1 (0.8).28 The 
project alternative under construction is Option 2.
The GO Regional Express Rail (RER) initiative dwarfs all other major rapid-transit projects in 
the GTHA, both in terms of expected project spending and, more importantly, in terms of value 
creation, as shown in Figure 4 below. GO RER is intended to transform the existing region-wide 
commuter rail network — currently used mainly for peak period trips to Toronto’s central business 
district—intoamorefrequent,two-way,all-dayservice,includingprovidingelectrifiedservicein
the core sections of the network. The initial business-case analysis examined four scenarios for the 
intensificationofservicesontheGOrailnetwork(relativetothedo-minimumscenario),withthe
BCRresultsinarangebetween1.6and3.1,excludingwidereconomicbenefits(WEBs)andGHG
impacts. The scenario currently in procurement is the best-performing scenario with a BCR of 
3.1(or3.3withWEBandGHGimpacts)anddeliversneteconomicvaluecreationof$24.8billion
(2014 dollars) over a 60-year period. The outstanding performance of this major project is due in 
large part to the fact that it relies on an existing and arguably underutilized asset — the heavy rail 
network corridor in the GTHA that was built for the freight railways and has been increasingly 
used for commuter rail services.29 According to the initial RER business case, the new off-peak 
services and more frequent, speedier RER journeys are expected to increase GO ridership by two 
and a half times between the years 2014 and 2029, while annual operating costs will increase by 
much less than two and half times (Metrolinx, 2015: iv). 
It is worth noting that GO RER is a region-wide project for the GTHA, like the REM for Greater 
Montreal. However, the REM project is a new light rail network, part of which will replace the 
existing heavy rail commuter network. The GO RER IBC did not examine a light rail/metro option 
in its alternatives analysis, although it is unlikely that such a new network would have been as 
cost-effective as the continued use of the heavy rail network, part of which continues to be used by 
the freight railways. As for the REM project, the business-case results are not publicly available, 
nor is it clear if the option of delivering an RER-equivalent project using the heavy rail network for 
Montreal was examined as an alternative.
The Scarborough Subway Extension (SSE) is intended to replace the aging Line 3 Scarborough, 
whichisamostly-elevatedlightraillinewithsixstops.TheSSEisafullyfunded$3.3-billion
single-stop extension of the Bloor-Danforth subway line from Kennedy Station to a new subway 
26 This represents an instance where BCRs are misleading in ranking project alternatives, because alternatives 1 and 3 should 
have a similar ranking given their NPV results.
27 See the Hamilton LRT project update on the Metrolinx website: http://www.metrolinx.com/en/projectsandprograms/
transitexpansionprojects/hamilton_lrt.aspx (accessed June 4, 2017). A previous version of the project would have had the 
LRT service from McMaster to Queenstown (i.e., three fewer stops than the McMaster-Eastgate Square version).
28 See Metrolinx (2008a). 
29 See Metrolinx (2015). This RER IBC does not include the 12 new stations proposed for the GO rail network, which were 
examined under separate IBCs. See http://www.metrolinx.com/en/docs/pdf/board_agenda/20160628/20160628_BoardMtg_
Regional_Express_Rail_EN.pdf. 
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station at Scarborough Centre 6.2 kilometres away.30 The SSE IBC examined only subway 
alternatives and it did not include a base case or do-minimum option. Hence, it is not possible to 
assess the economic-value creation resulting from the project. 
The extension of GO rail service along the Lakeshore East corridor to Bowmanville would provide 
four peak-period, peak-direction diesel-train services to and from Bowmanville via a new railway 
bridge crossing Highway 401 just west of the Oshawa GO station. The IBC examined only one 
option against a base case and found a BCR of 0.56, which implies value destruction in the order 
of$330million(in2015dollars).31 The study considered a second possible alignment south of the 
401 along the existing CN corridor. This would avoid the construction of the railway bridge, which 
accountsformostofthecapitalcostoftheproject($400million),butitwouldalsobefurtheraway
from the nearby local communities, which are mostly north of Highway 401, including downtown 
Oshawa, which is designated as a mobility hub. Perhaps for this reason, the second option was not 
evaluated in the CBA.
Figure 4 below summarizes the CBA results for the GTHA projects currently underway. It shows 
which ones create or destroy value and those with alternatives that were not pursued but might have 
delivered greater value.
FIGURE 4 PROJECT VALUE CREATION IN THE GTHA
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Note: Dots above the columns indicate projects where the CBAs showed alternatives with greater value.
4.3 Major Transit Projects in Metro Vancouver
MetroVancouverhasfivetransitprojectsthatfitthecriteriaforeligibleprojects.Twoofthese
projects are already in service: the Canada Line and the Millennium Line Evergreen Extension. 
Oneprojectisunderconstructionandtwoarefunded.Onlytwoofthefiveprojectsdonothave
business cases in the public domain. Hence, we do not know if these are creating value for users 
and the public at large. The three remaining projects all have business cases, with two of those 
—theCanadaLineandtheMillenniumLineEvergreenExtension—showingsignificantvalue
creation. However, neither of these projects has been subject to an ex post CBA, which would either 
confirmtheexpectedvaluecreationorrevisetheestimate.Moreover,thefirstphaseoftheSurrey
LRT is expected to destroy value, although this may turn out more positively depending on the 
option selected for Phase 2.
30 See City of Toronto and TTC (2016) and City of Toronto (2017).
31 See Metrolinx (2015a).
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TABLE 3 METRO VANCOUVER TRANSIT INVESTMENTS
Stage Capex $M Public CBA
Net Value 
$M, PV BCR
Alternatives 
Analyzed Ex Post CBA
Canada Line In service (2010) 1,604 Yes 296 1.25 Yes No
Millennium Line Evergreen Ext. In service (2016) 1,400 Yes 197 1.27 Yes No
Expo Line Upgrade Strategy Construction 1,092 No -- -- Yes N.A.
Surrey LRT Funded (2016) 2,180 Yes (510) 0.69 Yes N.A.
Millennium Line Broadway 
Extension(*) Funded (2016) 3,010 Yes 2,257 2.3 Yes N.A.
Notes: See notes in Table 1.
All figures expressed in currency of year reported, unless otherwise noted. 
Capital costs sourced from CBA and expressed in currency of year reported.
(*) Results reported for RRT (i.e., SkyTrain) option. 
The Canada Line is the third line built as part of Vancouver’s SkyTrain metro system. It connects 
downtown Vancouver to Richmond, B.C. and to Vancouver International Airport. The Multiple 
Account Evaluation study examined four options: an exclusive and a shared right-of-way, and either 
built either by 2010 or by 2021.32 The exclusive right-of-way option was built and opened for service 
in2010.However,theMAEstudydidnotreportaneconomicbenefit-costratio.Assumingthatthe
userbenefitsreportedfortransitandroadusersrepresentthetotaluserbenefits(i.e.,theadditional
revenue from transit users does not represent an additional willingness to pay for the project), the 
projectoptionthatwasbuiltexhibitedaBCRof1.25andneteconomicvaluecreationof$295
millionin2001dollarsatafive-per-centrealdiscountrate.33 The same exclusive right-of-way 
optionbuiltin2021hadaBCRof1.53andnetvaluecreationof$359million.Notwithstandingthe
importance of the project for the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010, it is unlikely that the Canada 
Line could have been built a decade later at the capital costs reported in the MAE study. This 
suggests it may have been the right decision not to postpone the Canada Line to 2021.
The Millennium Line Evergreen Extension to the SkyTrain network was completed and in service 
in 2016. The CBA examined several alternatives, including LRT and ALRT (i.e., advanced light 
rail transit, the SkyTrain-type technology). The project alternative implemented (ALRT for the 
Northwestcorridor)hadaBCRof1.27andentailsnetvaluecreationof$197in2008dollars.34 It is 
also the alternative that delivers the greatest economic value.
TheExpoLineUpgradeStrategyisintendedtoincreasethecapacityofthefirstSkyTrainline.
Severaloptionswereexamined,includingfour-carandfive-caroptions,althoughnoexplicit
benefit-costanalysisappearstohavebeenundertaken.35 The project is now underway and consists 
ofthefive-caroption,whichincludesthecostofmoretrainsandassociatedinfrastructureupgrades
to several stations.
The Surrey LRT project consists of two lines to be delivered in two phases. Phase 1 is an 
11-kilometre L-shaped line linking Guildford Town Centre, Surrey City Centre and Newton Town 
Centre, and Phase 2 is a 17-kilometre line linking Surrey City Centre and Langley Town Centre. 
The alternatives analysis examined 13 alternatives for the two phases jointly, including BRT, LRT 
32 See IBI Group (2001). 
33 Alternatively, if the net transit revenue from the project represented an additional willingness to pay for the transit services 
(i.e.,thosebenefitswerenotcapturedinthereporteduserbenefits),theBCRwouldbe1.39andthevaluecreationwouldbe
$457millionin2001dollars.
34 See TransLink (2008: 29).
35 See SNC Lavalin, Steer Davies Gleave (2010).
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and rapid rail transit (i.e., the SkyTrain technology).36 However, it is not entirely clear which option 
has been selected for funding and procurement. We know from the City of Surrey website that 
Phase 1 of the project has been funded and the preferred option is an LRT for both phases.37 This 
option is closest to the alternative called “LRT1” in the alternatives study, which has a BCR of 0.69 
andwouldresultinaneconomiclossof$510millionin2010dollarsdiscountedatasix-per-cent
real interest rate.38 The top-performing alternative in the IBI Group (2012) study was “RRT1,” 
which consisted of the SkyTrain extension to Langley alone (Phase 2) without any rapid transit 
service for the L-shaped corridor linking Guildford, Surrey City Centre and Newton — at a BCR 
of 1.55. The next best option was “RRT1A” at a BCR of 1.45, which is the same as the “RRT1,” but 
it also has a BRT service for the L-shaped corridor mentioned above. 
While the “LRT1” alternative is closest in concept to the project that is underway, the business-case 
results could differ from the 0.69 result for two reasons: (i) the “LRT1” option also includes a BRT 
segment from Newton to White Rock, which does not appear in the project described on the City 
of Surrey website, but it is unclear whether or not this component would improve the results; and 
(ii) Phase 2 could potentially be an extension of the existing SkyTrain service (instead of an LRT), 
whichwouldimprovethebusiness-caseresultssignificantly.ItisalsopossibletoinferthataBRT
alternative for the L-shaped corridor in Phase 1 would have a BCR of 1.15.39 Hence, this option is 
shown as the superior alternative to the Surrey LRT project shown in Figure 5 below.
The Millennium Line Broadway Extension project is an extension of the existing SkyTrain 
Millennium Line from VCC-Clark station through to Arbutus Street, with six underground stations 
on Broadway and a BRT service from Arbutus through to the University of British Columbia. As 
for other projects, it is challenging to link the project underway to the alternatives evaluated in the 
CBA. The CBA screened an initial 200 options, including three technology alternatives (BRT, LRT 
andRRT,i.e.,theSkyTraintechnology)andthenshortlistedsevenfinaloptionsforanalysis.40 The 
RRT option — which would entail an extension of the SkyTrain all the way to UBC — was the 
highest-performingoptionwithaBCRof2.3andvaluecreationof$2,257millionin2010dollars
discounted at a real interest rate of six per cent. However, the project underway is a phased version 
of the RRT option, with the RRT initially going to Arbutus Street and then to UBC in a future 
phase. The phased version was not fully evaluated, but the CBA did note that the phased RRT had 
a BCR of 2.7.41 However, the results reported in Table 3 above and Figure 5 below are for the full 
RRT option without phasing.
Figure 5 below summarizes the CBA results for the Metro Vancouver projects that have been 
recently completed or are currently underway. It shows that most of these have either delivered 
net positive value (e.g., the Canada Line) or are expected to do so. The one exception is the Surrey 
LRT, which may not deliver value in its current form, although Phase 2 could restore the overall 
project to net positive value creation if it is delivered as an extension of the existing SkyTrain 
service rather than as an LRT. Finally, there is some evidence that the projects underway were not 
the highest-value alternatives available to decision-makers. This can probably be discounted in the 
case of the Canada Line, where the alternative referred to the same project delivered 10 years later, 
but it remains a concern for the Surrey LRT.
36 See IBI Group (2012).
37 
Seehttp://www.surrey.ca/files/LRTMap.pdf.
38 But LRT1 also includes a BRT segment from Newton to White Rock, which does not appear in the project described on the 
City of Surrey website.
39 This can be deduced by taking the difference between “RRT1A” and “RRT1,” which amounts to the BRT linking Guildford, 
Surrey and Newton.
40 See Steer Davies Gleave and SNC Lavalin (2012). 
41 Steer Davies Gleave and SNC Lavalin (2012: 146, paragraph 12.26).
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FIGURE 5 PROJECT VALUE CREATION IN METRO VANCOUVER
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Note: Dots above the columns indicate projects where the CBAs showed alternatives with greater value.
5.  BUSINESS CASE RESULTS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND GOOD  
INDUSTRY PRACTICES
The review of business cases for 21 major public-transit projects across Canada’s three largest 
urban areas provides the basis for a number of recommendations, lessons and good industry 
practices for the sponsor governments, transit agencies and senior-level governments funding the 
projects.Theserecommendationsalsoapplytootherassetclasseswherebenefitsandcostsare
easilyvaluedatsocialprices(i.e.,atpricesthatreflecttheusers’willingnesstopayandbenefitsor
costs to the public at large), including water, environmental and energy assets.
First, business cases should be undertaken for all major projects in order to assess if they provide 
a net improvement in well-being for users and the public. This applies to projects which require 
public funding as well as to privately funded projects which may have negative externalities. This 
also means identifying at least one version of the project under consideration and comparing it to a 
base case (or do-minimum) scenario that represents a reasonable and realistic view of the world in 
the absence of the project. It also means analyzing the project option against the base case through 
the following lenses:
• Strategic—Istheproblemathandwell-definedandunderstood?Doestheoptionaddressthe
problem at hand? Are there any other options that can also address the problem and should 
therefore be subject to evaluation?
• Financial—Whatwillbethefinancialimpactofeachprojectoptionrelativetothebasecase
for the project owner (e.g., the municipality) and possibly for neighbouring municipalities 
and their operating entities (e.g., transit operators)? Can the sponsoring government afford to 
invest in the project? What additional funding is required by the sponsor during construction 
and operations?
• Economic — Is the affected region better or worse off as a result of the project (and by how 
much)?Theeconomicassessmentshouldcovercostsandbenefitsforusersandforthepublic
atlargeoverasufficientlylongtimeperiodtocapturemostoftheprojectlifecycle.
• Deliverability — Is the project option technically and commercially feasible to build 
andoperate?Oraretheresignificantchallengesintermsofconstructability,stakeholder
engagement, access to property, operations or other factors that could materially affect costs 
and/or schedule, or could even require it to be abandoned?
There are many cases of governments in recent history that have not undertaken such business 
cases, especially when project funding was already secured. In some cases, governments have 
explicitly avoided answering the above questions (e.g., when business cases do not have a 
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reasonable economic case), thereby resulting in a “business case” in name only. The result is that 
decision-makers are left in the dark as to the true impacts of the projects they are embarking on.
Secondly, business cases should be made publicly available in advance of the point in the delivery 
of the project where it is no longer possible to change course (or abandon the project) without 
significantliabilitiesandsunkcostsforthesponsorgovernment.Thispointisusuallythemiddleto
end of the procurement process. Without a publicly available business case that answers the above 
questions, there can be no transparency and no accountability for the sponsor governments, nor for 
any senior-level government funders. This leaves plenty of room for special interests to prevail.
Third, projects should be prioritized based on net economic value creation. This is the measure 
that best captures the broad public interest, including the interest of both users and society at large. 
In the case of the public-transit projects, user impacts cover changes in travel time and costs for 
transit and road users, as well as safety impacts. In addition, studies often monetize environmental 
impacts (e.g., GHG and local air-quality emissions). In some cases, studies also examine the wider 
economicbenefitsofprojects.Hence,thismeasureofvalueisthebroadestavailabletocapture
various dimensions of the public interest.
Project prioritization should be based on the following decision rules. For any one project, the 
preferred option should have:
1. Abenefit-costratio(BCR)greaterthan1:1forthefuturestreamofeconomiccostsand
benefits.(Alternatively,theneteconomicbenefitsoftheprojectmeasuredinnet-present-value
termsshouldbegreaterthanzero).Withoutthis,therecanbenoconfidencethattheproject
is improving public welfare (on a net-of-cost basis), which raises the question as to why the 
project is being pursued. Even a preferred option with a very low (or break-even) BCR could 
resultinnovaluecreationifthereisacostoverrunorifuserbenefitsareoverestimated,bothof
which are common occurrences.
2. Thehighestnetpresentvalue(NPV)ofeconomicbenefits.(ThehighestBCRratiodoesnot
alwaysyieldtheprojectwiththegreatestnetbenefits).42 In the presence of a budget constraint, 
the correct decision rule is to choose the option within the budget constraint with the greatest 
economic NPV.43  
Other analysts have suggested a variation on the above decision rules for senior-level 
governments seeking to maximize the value impact of their funding.44 
The second decision rule can be more challenging to implement in practice, due to a whole host of 
reasons ranging from community preferences to more practical issues relating to the deliverability 
of certain options. However, it is the gold standard for decision-making intended to promote the 
public good as well as the productivity and competitiveness of the regional economy in question. 
Prioritizing investments across different projects is a more challenging proposition. The power of 
CBAs is that these allow, at least in principle, for a comparison of different projects across different 
types of assets on a like-for-like basis. This implies that rule 2 above should also apply to choosing 
whichproject(s)deliverthegreatestbenefits.However,inpractice,thisrequiresanumberof
assumptions, notably that:
42 For project options of different sizes, it is possible for a project with the highest NPV to have a lower BCR than other 
projectswithalowerNPV.Inaddition,thecalculationoftheBCRcanbesensitivetothewayinwhichcostsaredefined.
See chapter 4 (“Discounting and Alternative Investment Criteria”) of Jenkins, Kuo and Harberger (2011) for a full 
discussion of the BCR, net present value and other decision rules for the choice of investments. 
43 Note that both decision rules (i.e., highest NPV with or without budget constraints) apply only when options are mutually 
exclusive. 
44 
Forexample,seeRobins(2017:16)suggestingthatthenewCanadaInfrastructureBankusea“netbenefits-government
investmentratio”asamoreappropriatedecisionrulethantheoverallbenefit-costratio.
21
• The CBA studies compared provide a complete representation of the applicable costs and 
benefits.
• The CBA studies compared are based on accurate assumptions about the unit values of 
differenttypesofbenefits.Forexample,publictransportationprojectsinanyoneregionare
usually based on the same set of valuation assumptions, which are usually set by the regional 
planning authority.
Inpractice,thetwoassumptionsareeasilyverifiableonlywhendealingwithasingleassetclass
(e.g., rapid transit) in one region, like the GTHA. It is much more challenging to compare different 
types of projects, especially across different regions. Figure 6 below shows the types of travel-time, 
costandrelatedbenefitsthathavebeenevaluatedforthesevenGTHArapidtransitprojectswith
CBAs reported in the last section. While all the CBAs examine basic categories such as transit 
andautotravel-timeimpacts,othersincorporateotherbenefitssuchasimprovedreliability,urban
realm or agglomeration economies in the CBA results. We also know that most of the underlying 
valuation and discount assumptions are identical between the studies.45 While it is possible to 
compare all CBAs on a like-for-like basis (i.e., covering the same minimum set of impacts), this 
is not necessarily the correct approach because some types of impacts (like reliability), may be 
more important for some projects than others. In summary, a prioritization across different projects 
requires a very careful analysis of the CBA results. However, in this case, it is unlikely that such a 
reconciliation would alter the main features of the CBA results in Figure 4 (section 4.2), such as the 
standout performance of GO RER.
FIGURE 6 COMPARISON OF IMPACTS VALUED FOR SELECTED SET OF METROLINX RAPID TRANSIT CBAs
    Eglinton Crosstown 
Hurontario 
LRT(**) 
Finch West 
LRT (***) Hamilton LRT VIVANext GO RER 
GO Rail 
Bowmanville 
Service Extension 
Travel time Transit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  Auto yes yes yes yes yes yes   
  Reliabiliy yes     yes qual qual   
  Convenience/comfort     qual   qual qual   
  
Crowding relief (other 
modes)*           qual   
Travel costs Vehicle operating costs yes yes yes yes yes yes   
  Fares yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
  Safety (road collisions) yes yes yes yes yes yes   
  Urban realm   yes           
Environment GHGs yes yes yes yes yes yes   
  CACs           yes   
Wider Economic 
Benefits Agglomeration economies yes         yes   
  Labour supply yes             
  Imperfect competition yes             
Economic 
Development Economic impacts yes yes yes yes yes     
  Land value uplift yes yes yes yes yes     
Social/Community Land use change qual   qual qual qual     
  Health qual yes     qual     
  Accessibility qual             
  
Traffic and community 
Impacts       qual qual     
Approach   MAE 4-Case MAE MAE MAE 4-Case 4-Case 
Notes: (*) Excluding road decongestion benefits;  Legend:             
(**) Based on SDG (2016a) Quantified and included in CBA       
(***) Based on SDG (2015) 
Quantified but not included in 
CBA       
   Assessed qualitatively (qual)       
    Not evaluated             
 
ThefifthrecommendationisthatexpostCBAstudiesshouldbeundertakenforallcompleted
projects once these have had two to three years to ramp up to their steady-state growth. This 
recommendation applies to all the jurisdictions examined and to all completed projects reviewed in 
45 
OneexceptionisthattheearlierCBAs,notablyVIVA,usedarealdiscountrateoffivepercent,whilethemorerecentCBAs
used a 3.5-per-cent discount rate. 
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this report, some of which have clearly not met original expectations regarding ridership and fares 
(e.g., the Union Pearson Express) and would, on that basis alone, merit an ex post CBA review.46 
In addition to the above recommendations, we would recommend the following good industry 
practices:
• CBAstudiesshouldnotbetreatedonlyasanexpostjustificationofaprojectoption
developed through an unrelated planning process. CBAs are a tool that should be used to 
evaluate alternative project options and where appropriate, illustrate any trade-offs. The 
development and evaluation of project options should be an iterative process. Following an 
initialevaluation,optionfeaturescanbemodifiedtoimproveprojectperformance;followed
by a re-evaluation. All option features should be considered, including but not limited to: 
(i) service offering, (ii) vehicle technology, (iii) project phasing (iv) end-user pricing and (v) 
target-market segments.
• CBA studies should be made publicly available at a single location that can be easily found 
from the main website of the government sponsor or agency.47 Clearly this suggestion applies 
to entities such as Metrolinx or TransLink, which have responsibility for or oversight of 
multiple projects in their respective regions.
• The CBA website above should indicate clearly which project option has been advanced for 
future analysis or procurement (i.e., the “preferred option”) and what changes, if any, have 
been made to the latest version of the project as compared to the preferred option analyzed 
in the CBA. It is recognized that a project evolves through various stages of approvals, 
including environmental assessments, preliminary design and procurement. As a result, 
it is often unclear how the project options analyzed in the CBA relate to the version of the 
project that is underway. A brief explanation on the website indicating which CBA option 
isthepreferredoptionandanysignificantdifferencesrelativetothelatestversionofproject
underway would support greater transparency.
• CBA studies should also be updated at appropriate stages in the evolution of the project. 
For example, an initial CBA would examine a full range of project options, illustrating the 
process for arriving at a short list of options for analysis. An updated or intermediate CBA 
would undertake a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis of one or two options. And a 
finalCBAwoulddoanin-depthanalysisofthepreferredoptionfollowingcompletionofthe
procurement stage. Each of these should be made publicly available on the CBA website.
46 Ex post assessments are increasingly common in western European countries such as the U.K. and France. See ITF (2015).
47 By way of example, see links on the Metrolinx website: http://www.metrolinx.com/en/regionalplanning/projectevaluation/
benefitscases/benefits_case_analyses.aspx.
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